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INTRODUCTION
Motivations and Objectives
Public sector institutions in developing countries,
particularly the Parastatals, Boards, Corporations and the like,
have increasingly come to be criticized for gross inefficiencies
(Raj 1977, Chopra 1982). In part, this criticism is based on a
trend of attacking public institutions in general. In part, it
is based on a concern for fiscal efficiency amidst a time of
deepening fiscal crisis of most governments or, a concern for
low outputs relative to the investments made in these
institutions. Whatever be the reasons for these criticisms,
given the huge investments that have been made in these
agencies, it is not surprising that studies are being made to
establish precisely how these institutions have performed
relative to their stated goals.
This thesis focuses on the State Housing Board in Bihar,
India. It is an evaluation of this organization, established in
1972 to deliver housing and land in a cost-effective manner. We
explain why the organization was not able to meet its goals.
Conceptual Framework
The performance of organizations relative to their
stated goals has been the focus of evaluation in the field of
organization analysis (Perrow, 1961; Pierce, 1968; Scott, 1981).
The relevant literature has suggested three ways of looking at
1
organizations -- ie. the rational, natural and open systems
perspectives; and has identified goals and criteria for
evaluation that correspond to those perspectives. The rational
systems perspective views organizations as instruments for
attainment of its stated goals, and criteria for evaluation
stressed are the numbers and qualities of outputs and economies
in the use of inputs (Mannheim, 1950; Simon, 1957, 1964). The
natural systems perspective views organizations as
collectivities capable of achieving specified goals but
simultaneously engaged in other activities required to maintain
themselves as a social unit. In addition to the criteria used
in the rational systems view, the criteria emphasized in the
natural systems perspective include measures of morale of
participants, and incentives for people in the organization to
ensure its survival (Barnard, 1938; Clark and Wilson, 1961;
Etzioni, 1961; Perrow, 1970). The open systems perspective
views organizations as highly interdependent with their
environments and as engaged in system-elaborating as well as
system-maintaining activities. The organization's adaptive
capacity to respond to problems, or its bargaining position, are
considered to be important criteria -- reflected in the ability
of the organization to exploit its environment to acquire scarce
resources needed (March and Simon, 1958; Pfeffer and Salanick,
1978).
The organization that we will examine appears to have
not met any of the goals that these three perspectives suggest:
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the Housing Board's inability to acquire one of the key
resources, land , explains its inability to meet its stated
goals of high output of housing and serviced plots ; a low
morale -- reflected in the 1985 petitions by the staff to the
government to scrap the organization itself, suggests reluctance
and inability of the organization to maintain its survival and,
therefore, to meet its goals. We consider these and other goals
espoused by people within the organization and we conclude that
these goals were not even reasonably met. In terms of
evaluating the organization's performance, we will attempt to
explain why those goals were not met. In the evaluation,
therefore, we do not attempt to put a normative or a measurable
value on what the organization achieved (outcome, in the
rational systems view), on how it was achieved (process, in the
natural systems view) or on the capacity of the organization to
acquire resources (structure, in the open systems view). By
attempting to establish causality or, simply, explaining why
things happened the way they did -- ie. why goals were not met,
we emphasize another meaning of the word "evaluation" as used in
evaluation research -- one which refers to understanding and
appreciation (Hudson, 1975; Forrester, 1975).
First, we will examine factors that appear to have
constrained the organization's performance. For example, we
will focus on lack of direction or conflicting goals, lack of
morale/individual incentives for participants in the
organization and, constraints due to lack of coordination with
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interdependent organizations and lack of bargaining power or,
the capacity to maintain support from the environment for
acquiring key resources.
In addition to these factors generated by the three
perspectives on organizations, we will consider a specific
factor that appears to offer a unique explanation for the
Housing Board's performance: - namely, the extent to which the
organization's changing image determined the organization's
actual performance. We will observe that image and performance
of the organization were positively linked: better image was
associated with better performance and vice versa. In general
terms, we will discuss the proposition that the image or the
expectation of how an organization will perform in future, (from
the perspective of people controlling inputs and benefiting from
outputs), determine whether an organization is able to meet its
stated goals or not.
Based on our general concern for examining the
performance of public sector organizations, the central theme of
our study is to explore the question, "why did the Housing Board
perform the way it did between 1972 and 1985 and what explains
the extremely poor image of the Board in 1985"? We begin the
story in Chapter I by setting the context, and describe the
factors that led to the formation of the Housing Board in 1972.
Subsequently in Chapter II, we give an account of what the Board
did between 1972 and 1975. We tell this story to illustrate the
4
five factors that seem to explain the Board's performance -- ie.
lack of direction, incentives, inter-agency coordination,
support from the 'environment'/ Board's bargaining power and
Board's own image. In Chapter III, we re-examine the story by
considering the extent to which each of these five factors
really explain why the Housing Board could not meet its stated
goals.
The key questions, then, are the following:
(1) How did the Housing Board come into being, and
how did it define housing as a problem? (Ch.I)
(2) What did it do? (Ch. II)
(3) What really happened? (Ch.III)
(4) What are the implications of the story for
future research and policy? (Conclusions)
Research Methodology
This research is based on personal interviews with key
actors in the rise and the fall of the Housing Board. It was
assumed that the Housing Board's direction was primarily
influenced by its members in the leadership role. Consequently,
the top management staff who have been with the Board between
1972 and 1985 were interviewed to identify, goals deemeed
important by them or their approaches to the housing problem.
Field officers and middle level staff were interviewed to
establish work incentives avilable to them. By speaking to
several employees who have been with the Housing Board ever
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since its formation, I tried to get indications of changes in
staff morale and Board's image during different periods of the
Board's existence. Interviews with the staff of interdependent
organizations were conducted to assess coordination problems.
Key personnel from the financing institutions were interviewed
to determine why they continued to fund the Housing Board which
clearly appeared to be performing poorly. Ministers of the
ruling political party and members of the state judiciary told
me about the extent to which Housing Board received support from
the 'environment' in which it operated. Housing Board's reports
were reviewed to to document the organization's performance in
terms of outputs produced, and three main project sites were
visited to determine the validity of those claims. Finally, I
spoke with some of the residents and private landowners in and
around these project areas, to understand how they had been
affected by Housing Board's projects and how they had responded
to them.
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CHAPTER 1
Since independence in 1947, Bihar has been one of
India's poorest states. Patna, the capital city with a
population of about a million and the focus of Housing Board's
activities, is described in contradictory ways. For example,
one hears of Patna's ancient glory, its strategic importance in
the colonial past and its current status as a fairly flourishing
city. But, Patna is also scorned as a somewhat rural, dirty
place, with predominantly poor people and a growing shelter
problem. Patna's concentrated physical growth and high
population density, exacerbated by certain geographical
constraints, reinforced the city's poor image. The capital
city's semi-urban/semi-rural look became one of the concerns of
the state government.
Various attempts were made to change this image. In the
field of housing, several agencies were established. For
example, the Housing Department was set up in the state
secretariat during the late 1940s to implement public housing
projects and distribute housing loans to individuals. The
Cooperative Department was established to extend loans to the
private housing cooperatives. Patna Improvement Trust (PIT), a
local government body set up in 1952, implemented housing
projects and provided extensive infrastructure services
exclusively for the city of Patna. Finally, the department of
Local Self Government (LSG) was established at the secretariat
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level to coordinate the activities of the Local government
bodies with that of the Housing department.
Despite good intentions, these organizations contributed
little to either the housing stock or to the image of the city.
For example, while the Housing Department had started innovative
schemes similar to today's site & services projects,
implementation problems, wrong interest payment calculations and
discrimination in loan distributions resulted in low output
(20000 tenements in 20 years), incomplete projects and a bad
name for the organization. The Cooperative department also had
little to contribute in terms of output. Only those private
housing cooperatives formed by influential senior government
officials benefited -- by securing government loans and by using
the machinery of the State government to make land acquisition
somewhat easy and at minimum cost (Housing Board Report, 1973).
The Patna Improvement Trust (PIT) met with a fate similar to
that of the Housing Department: it was commended for its slum-
upgrading and site & services type approaches, and at the same
time it was charged with extensive diversion of public funds,
construction irregularities and the like (PIT Commission report,
1969).
Disenchantment with the performance of these
organizations, concern for a growing image problem and a housing
problem, set the grounds for a performance-oriented housing
organization to emerge. It is not surprising, therefore, that
when Housing Department approached the Life Insurance Company
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(LIC) for loans for housing projects, the LIC Chairman stressed
that loans would only be provided to a statutory/semi-autonomous
agency which is led by a competent engineer. At the same time,
in 1970, India's primary housing finance institution, the
Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO), was
established at the Central level with the explicit objective of
financing semi-autonomous housing agencies. At the state level,
too, an important event occurred: the popular ministry was
dissolved and Bihar came under President's rule (1). More
importantly, Bihar came under the leadership of Governor
D.K.Barooah who was later to play a key role in formation of the
Housing Board.
The Formation of the Housing Board
The Governor was known to consider housing as an
important area of government intervention and chose it as one of
the sectors where he wanted his impact felt. His position as
the temporary head of the state (1) brought him in close contact
with the senior officers of the housing and urban development
related organizations. Among these officers, he seemed to have
been fairly impressed by the qualifications and reputation of
the Special Officer at the Public Works Department, Mr.P.J.
Prasad, particularly by his versatile experience in the field of
engineering and housing. The Governor's interests coincided
with those of the LIC Chairman and the HUDCO, and the Governor
issued an ordinace in 1972 to set up the Housing Board with
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Prasad as its first Chairman and chief executive. The ordinace
had to be renewed every six months as it was not an Act of the
legislature. The Governor's special powers allowed him to
override the protracted legislative-style decision-making
involved in the setting up of government institutions and
appointing institutional heads. Soon after the Housing Board
came into being, the state election was announced ; the
President's rule ended; and the Governor relinquished his
special powers to the newly elected Chief Minister from the
Congress party.
Six months passed and the Housing Board Ordinance lapsed
(2). The ruling congress party allowed the ordinance to lapse
because it wanted to reconstitute the Board with a political
appointee as the Chairman with Mr. Prasad as the
technical/administrative head in the no.2 position. This is
actually quite a common phenomenon, particularly strong during
the formative stages of a new ministry, which must retain the
support of the members of the legislative assembly (MLAs) by
offering them chairmanships of public sector undertakings/
parastatals and boards. These positions not only supplement
income of the MLAs but also include benefits such as staff-cars,
official residences, peons and other amenities. Mr. Prasad
strongly protested the ruling party's move, but the Governor's
Ordinance was allowed to lapse. Thus, the Housing Board ceased
to exist and Mr. Prasad went back to the PWD. Governor
Barooah, however, considered this development to be a personal
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humiliation, also because he belonged to the same political
party as the state Chief Minister. Besides, being Prime
Minister's direct nominee, the Governor's allegiance lay more to
the Centre than to Bihar's elected ministry. So, Governor
Barooah expressed his extreme displeasure to the state Chief
Minister in categorical terms. As a result, within a month the
Housing Board was re-created and Mr. Prasad was reinstated as
the Chairman of the organization.
Having survived the first crisis, the Housing Board
structured itself in the institutional environment. Being a
semi-autonomous institution, its formal link with the state
government was through the state secretariat's Housing
Department which could only give broad policy directions to the
Housing Board. Housing Board's semi-autonomous status was
further enhanced by the fact that the state's ruling party could
control Housing Board's activities only indirectly -- by
pressurizing Housing Department in the legislative assembly.
The following chart illustrates the institutional environment
and describes the linkages and responsibilities of the
interdependent organizations.
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Description of Linkages and Resposibilities
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LINE OF CONTROL
DIRECT ACCESS
INFORMAL ACCESS
FEEDBACK
REPRESENTATION
(Authority)
(Broad policy direction)
(Consultation)
(Reporting)
(On Board Committee)
Central Government
Technically, Housing is the responibility of the state
governments, but central government can exercise some leverage
through:
Planning Commission and Ministry of Housing -- sets very general
policy guidelines/housing strategies.
Reserve Bank of India -- Sets limits on market borrowing for all
institutions.
Ministry of Finance -- issues public bonds for the national
financial institutions supplying funds(loans) to the Housing
Board.
Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO); Life Insurance
Company (LIC); General Insurance Company (GIC); Nationalized
Banks -- supplying project-specific loans to the Housing Board.
State Government
In principle, any guideline from the state government
agencies and the legislature to the Housing Board, must be
addressed through the Housing Department. For coordination
purposes, most of the following agencies are represented on the
Housing Board Committee:
Housing Department -- ensures the compliance of adminstrative
rules and state's broad policy guidelines. Provides some funds as
administrative grants. Represents Housing Board in the state's
legislative assembly (the cabinet).
Planning Department -- advises the state government (the executive
and the legislative branches) on funds to be allocated on the
housing sector in general.
Finance Department -- issues Five Year Plan funds (and loans)
allocated by the state government to the Housing Board.
Town Planning Department -- advises Housing Board on Master Plans.
Public Works Department (PWD)/Public Health Engineering Department
(PHED) -- advises Housing Board on infrastructure/construction
technicalities.
Department of Local Self Government (LSG) -- represents the local
government bodies such as the Municipal Corporation which are
responsible for Housing Board projects' maintenance and property-
tax collection. The LSG also advises on local land-use and
infrastructure plans.
Department of Civil Supplies -- supplies subsidized cement and
steel to Housing Board (not represented on Board Committee).
Revenue Department -- acquires land for the Housing Board.
-12-
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With its responsibilities and its institutional role
clearly established, the Housing Board set out to tackle the
problem of housing.
Housing Board's goals, or its approach to the Housing Problem
"Operative goals designate the ends sought through the
actual operating policies of the organization; they tell us what
people in the organization actually are trying to do, regardless
of what the official goals say are the aims" (Perrow, 1961).
In evaluating the performance of the Housing Board, we
are concerned with the operative goals espoused by members of
the Housing Board Committee between 1972 and 1985. Five goal
statements or problem-definitions emerged from documents and
interviews with the top management at the Housing Board. The
first of these was accompanied by extensive statistical data on
Bihar's low urbanization rate, low urban unemployment rates
coupled with, high unemployment rates in rural areas, high
populatuion density and very low rural productivity. The
statistics was used to state that informal-bondage or semi-
feudal relations in the villages had prevented rural labour from
migrating in the past. Large scale finished urban housing was
considered to be an ideal incentive for potential rural in-
migrants and, therefore, a solution to the problem of low rural
productivity. Construction in general, together with the
untapped traditional and informal sectors of employment in urban
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areas, were seen to be highly labour absorbing. It was argued
that Housing Board should take a comprehensive view of a state-
level problem and, therefore, provide housing for the potential
in-migrants on a large scale.
The other goal statements were not supported by any
study or data and we found them to be mostly intuitively argued
cases.
For example, one of the arguments merely stated the need
for large scale intervention and neither analyzed the housing
problem per se nor identified any particular target group for
policy. According to this argument, the problem was defined as
lack of resources, which, if provided, would solve the housing
problem. This approach was probably the most undefined of all,
but it provided its advocates a sense of purpose in doing
something because they assumed that without the government
intervention people were incapable of taking care of their
housing needs.
Some Housing Board leaders saw the problem as one of
dealing with people's insatiable desires and changing tastes in
housing, and with the "unreasonable" demands causing housing
shortages which were impossible to satisfy. The proponents of
this view blamed the speculative private sector which catered to
these desires and which fuelled expectations by trying to
provide modern "dream houses". Accordingly, Housing Board's
role was to put necessary check on people's desires and
expectations by providing traditional, indigenous and modest
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shelters with the possibility of upgrading them in distant
future.
Some of the Housing Board leaders also empathized with
the problems of the low/middle class urban dwellers. These
dwellers were understood to have been caught up in 'formal
sector' jobs, having no time to organize resources to build
their own houses. Because of the resulting shortage, Housing
Board's role was seen to be that of providing fully finished
houses so that people could devote the time and energy saved to
things considered more important and productive than housing.
Some members of the Board Commiitte considered rural in-
migrants as contributing to the problem of housing. Housing was
such a basic need for the migrants, that their illegal and
haphazard building activities, in and around public land, were
found to obstruct implementation of efficient Master Plans. It
was argued that provision of infrastructure to these unregulated
developments was problematic and these areas were predicted to
become slums. As a result, the proponents of this view gave
little priority to the shelter part of the housing problem and
primarily advocated increased land supply, planned land
subdivision and the provision of efficiently laid out
infrastructure.
The similarities, differences and contradictions among
these approaches/goals are self-evident. While two of the five
goals did not advocate policies towards any specific target
group, the remaining differed in their prescriptions. For one
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approach, housing for the rural-migrants was the primary
concern; for the other, housing of the rural-migrants created
environmental problems and, therefore, this group's shelter-
building activities was to be regulated in a stringent manner.
Another view focused on an entirely different group, the urban
'formal sector' employees. There were also strong agreements.
For example, all the five approaches required a high output of
either serviced land or housing units -- that is, the primary
goal of the HousinQ Board was to siQnificantly add to the urban
housinQ stock. These views also reflected a faith in the
capacity of the Housing Board to achieve those goals.
In the following section, we describe what the Housing
Board did as a result of believing in these goals.
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CHAPTER 2
The performance of the Housing Board between 1972 and
1985 can be grouped into four parts, corresponding to
reconstitutions of the leadership structure as much as four
times during that period. The story about the changing
leadership, in brief, is as follows: between 1972 and 1975 the
Housing Board continued under the leadership of the first
Chairman. The events surrounding this appointment and
reappointment were described earlier. In 1975, a member of the
legislative assembly (MLA) from the ruling congress party was
appointed the Chairman of the Board, replacing Mr. Prasad who
was the Governor's nominee. Since Mr. Prasad resigned in
response to this change, another officer with a technical
background was appointed the Managing Director as the no.2
person in the organization. In 1978, the Managing Director was
replaced by an adminstrator/bureaucrat from the Indian
Administrative Service (IAS). Surprisingly in 1982, the
Chairman from the ruling political party was removed from the
Board, the top two positions were merged and the IAS bureaucrats
started to hold jointly the posts of the Chairman and the
Managing Director. Then, in terms of leadership structure, the
Housing Board reverted to its original format with the
bureaucrats displacing the technocrats in the organization.
What follows is a brief description of the performance
of the organization during these periods of changing leadership.
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The description also examines the role of several factors -- ie.
lack of direction; incentives; coordination; support/bargaining
power and image -- that seem to explain why the Board was unable
to meet the various goals mentioned earlier.
(a) 1972 - 1975
With the Housing Board's creation in 1972, its
dissolution in six months and subsequent re-creation, the
attention of Bihar's political leaders, its bureaucracy and the
media, turned to the battle over the appointment of Housing
Board's chief. Governor Barooah's direct involvement in an area
outside his official domain, attracted further public attention
on the Housing Board. When the controversy was resolved, the
organization and its Chairman, Mr. Prasad, were perceived to be
enjoying the blessings of a strong political leadership. As Mr.
Prasad recalls, "...with the desired level of political support
and autonomy in the maze of interdependent institutions, we were
able to begin in a professional way".
The Chairman was fairly clear about the general
direction of housing policy for he had been a strong proponent
of housing for the rural migrants. As a professional, however,
he felt the need to have a better estimate of the distribution
of housing demand in the state and, consequently, he initiated a
state-wide Demand Registration Process. The process required
people who wanted housing to declare their incomes and deposit
Rs.50 (about $5.00) in nationalized banks. The turnover was
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quick and encouraging for the Board: about 85% of the 58000 that
responded wanted houses as opposed to plots, and 50% of the
applicants preferred Patna to any of the other towns in the
state. With these indicators of housing preferences, the Board
approached the state government and the financial institutions,
the Housing & Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) and the Life
Insurance Company (LIC), for financing housing projects.
The Board decided to temporarily shelve its goal of
helping the rural migrants in order to impress the financial
corporations (for funds) by presenting and publicizing smart-
looking housing projects. The media attention that the
organization received was a strong incentive for the technical
staff to prepare efficient and good-looking housing designs.
The financial institutions were impressed and the Board obtained
the necessary finance to carry out the demonstration projects.
With the Housing Board showing so much activity, the government
and the Reserve Bank allowed the Board to issue two public bonds
at good rates -- an allowance fairly unprecedented for new
public agencies in Bihar. Commercial banks were also tapped by
the Board for a cheap credit line, in exchange for cash advances
that were paid by people to participate in the demonstration
projects. With finances in place, the Board turned its
attention to obtain the land necessary for those projects.
In this area too, the Housing Board's image worked in
getting the necessary support of the Revenue Department, the
organization responsible for acquiring and disposing of land.
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About 600 acres of land was delivered within one year for the
Housing Board's first demonstration project (the Lohianagar
housing scheme in Patna). Most private land-owners were
compensated for their land, the compensation price being based
on the price of similar land that had been sold in the recent
past in an adjacent area. The swift coordination between the
Housing Board and the Revenue Department was primarily made
possible by the personal relationship between the heads of the
two organizations.
The Board did not encounter any problems in justifying
these demonstration projects in the National Five Year Plan (of
1974 -1979). According to the Chairman, the national housing
policy guidelines which the Board's project had to satisfy were
written in such general terms, and the monitoring of those
policies was so minimal, that guidelines could always be met.
The 2000-unit Lohianagar housing project had been divided into
several phases for implementation purposes. In addition to the
housing, the Housing Board was responsible for the primary
infrastructure -- ie. developing land/land-filling, laying the
entire sewage network and providing water, electricity and roads
in the project areas. Each phase of the project included a
range of housing options, but it was essentially a mix of group
and detached housing, quite conventional, with few plot
subdivisions, mostly unaffordable to the lower-income groups
(earning upto $100 per month). Since the national and state
housing policies included a large variety of housing strategies
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(3), the Housing Board got an implicit approval to proceed with
their Lohianagar project. According to the Chairman, it was the
intention of the Housing Board to implement this demonstration
project in order to gain support for housing rural migrants
which was considered less atrractive and less visible by the
political and the financial institutions.
The success of the Housing Board in procuring land and
the the general expectation that it was capable of successfully
implementing projects, appeared to have a positive effect on
staff morale and implementation proceded in a timely manner.
However, the time arrived for the Board to be reconstituted
because the Ordinance was about to lapse (Aug/Sep'75). With
Governor Barooah gone, the state ministry moved to put a
political appointee (an MLA) as the Chairman and change the
previous Chairman's designation to that of a Managing Director
in the no.2 position. The conflict thus triggered, resulted in
the first Chairman's resignation and, in the appointment of a
senior PWD engineer as Managing Director who was to serve under
the politically appointed Chairman of the Housing Board.
(b) 1975 - 1978
With this division of power at the top, other changes
were soon made in the composition of the Board's leadership
structure. Three additional members of the legislative assembly
of the ruling congress party were appointed in the Board
committee in positions reserved for housing experts. Unlike the
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previous chairman, the new managing director did not protest
these appointments; instead, he focused on his designated
responsibility to implement and plan projects identified during
the earlier period.
The new managing director's larger goals were
superseded by more immediate tasks at hand and he focused his
attention o
scheme. Whe
he began to
For example
cooperatives
the Housing
cooperatives
operating a
because the
n the implementation of the ongoing Lohianagar
n he started to plan for the project's second phase,
notice unexpected developments in the project area.
, private construction organized by housing
had started to mushroom, in complete violation of
Board's plans. It was found that most of these
had been formed almost 'overnight' by individuals
s builders or developers. These cooperatives,
y acted as a group or through political connections,
resisted repeated warnings by Housing Board officials to vacate
the officially acquired land. When these warnings turned into
threats of forcible eviction, the cooperative members managed to
obtain a stay order from the court on grounds that the
compensation price paid by the Housing Board had been unfair
(4). The Housing Board leadership reacted by establishing a
committee to look into the matter. With a court stay order in
place, no work could be comprehensively undertaken in the second
phase of the project. The Board turned its attention to the
completion of the first phase and the managing director started
the process of acquiring land for the Hanumannagar housing
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scheme in Patna -- another middle-income group (demonstration)
project conceived of during the earlier period.
In this project, the managing director encountered an
even stiffer resistance from the private land owners. They
simply refused to give up their land. The private landowners
petitioned to the Chairman of the Housing Board or other elected
representatives on the Board committee (the MLA-housing experts)
or even to the state housing minister on several grounds: that
the procedures of the Land Acquisition Act had not been fully
complied with; that plot measurements were wrongly taken; that
certain plots or portions of plots fell outside the area
notified for acquisition, or that certain areas were not at all
needed for serving the "public interest" -- which enabled the
Housing Board to acquire land under the law of eminent domain.
In this case as well, the Chairman appointed committees to
investigate the charges made by people. As a result of these
investigations and litigations, the Hanumannagar project
encountered severe delays in taking off. Though coordination
with institutions supplying finance and construction materials
remained unaffected, the managing director and his staff felt
helpless in the legal battles and the image of an efficient
organization began to crumble.
The state's senior bureaucrats blamed the managing
director of the Housing Board for inefficient management and
stressed the need for streamlining organizational procedures.
The legislators shared these views and they appointed a
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bureaucrat from the elite Indian Administrative Service as
managing director in the no.2 position. The previous managing
director went back to the Public Works Department to a more
coveted position in the technical core. At the Housing Board,
the position of the technical head slipped down to the no.3
position in the hierarchy. Amidst this reshuffling, the
Chairman was also replaced by another member of the ruling
congress party.
(c) 1978 - 1982
The new leadership of the Housing Board was more
concerned with procedural guidelines than with fulfilling the
earlier objectives of the organization. The managing director
wanted to make sure that all procedural rules were complied with
even at the expense of rapid project implementation. He focused
his energies on allotment procedures as some of the flats and
plots in the Board's first project were ready for occupation.
According to the guidelines, allotees were required to
pay the final installment before they took possession of their
houses or plots. When final payments were sought, the
management encountered problems that it had been expecting. In
most cases, periodic installments had not been made. As
defaults had piled up, the individual's capacity to pay old and
new dues had worsened. The managing director also found it
difficult to deal with many defaulters who had started to live
in houses or had started to build on plots even before formal
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allotments had been made. The management was also aware of many
occupants who had either never registered in the first place,
who had jumped the allotment queue, or who were simply
ineligible for the particular flats they occupied (as determined
by income levels). Because many unauthorized allottments were
made by the political appointees on the Board itself, the
management staff did not know how to manage the situation most
effectively. This dilemma created serious management problems
because the managing director could not treat these 'irregular'
cases differently. But he ended up doing just that because of
political pressures from other Board members. Once precedents
had been established, the management had no option but to
indulge in lengthy negotiations and justifications with every
faulty allotment case.
With these problematic cases piling up, the managing
director's role was being reduced to a paper-pushing one because
decisions would be postponed in favor of investigations (that
would never be conducted). The reputation of the Board came to
be known as an inefficent organization and few bureaucrats
wanted to be associated with it. They felt that their career-
resumes would be damaged, affecting their career mobility and
dimming the prospects of being transferred to important
positions in the state or at the centre. It is not surprising
then that as many as five bureaucrats served in this position
within the short period of four years. They would maneouvre the
state bureaucracy or the state ministry to have them
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transferred. The reluctance of the organizational heads to stay
with the Board for a long time, also led to a low morale among
the staff in the organization.
However, the financial institutions seemed unruffled and
HUDCO came forward to finance another large housing project --
the 2500-unit housing project in Bahadurpur, Patna. This
project, too, had been conceived of during the initial years of
the Board as a demonstration project, and contained the same mix
of housing types. While funds from HUDCO and the other
financial institutions kept coming, there was little progress on
project-implementation because political meddling in land
acquisition and resistance of the private land-owners continued.
Surprisingly, at this time the state ministry decided to
withdraw its appointed Chairman and let the bureaucrats take
control of the organization. The posts of the Chairman and the
Managing Director were merged and the Board reverted to its
original format with the bureaucrats displacing the technocrats
in the organization.
(d) 1982 - 1985
When the bureaucrats took control of the organization in
1982, political meddling in matters related to land acquisition
and allotments almost stopped because most of the politicians
were out of the Board. However, as a result of past
performance, Housing Board's image in the public eye was at its
worst and as a result of legal precedents established in land
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litigations, the resistance of the private land-owners grew
stronger. The media suggested that there had been political
interference and huge misappropriation of public funds. The
Board officials denied most charges but could not deny that
output by early '80s had been very low, except for the few
initial years. More embarrassing was the fact that most of the
projects (the Lohianagar, Hanumannagar and part of the
Bahadurpur housing project) that the Board claimed to have
completed, were in a poor state of maintenance.
The Housing Board management blamed the Municipal
Corporation for inefficient maintenance. The real story turned
out to be otherwise: The Municipal Corporation was not willing
to take the blame for maintaining projects with incomplete land
filling, incomplete sewage network and incomplete roads. The
image of both organizations suffered as scenes of choked sewage
networks, littered garbage and boats plying in water-logged
streets of project areas, marked the end of monsoons. The
Housing Board pressurized the Municipal Corporation through the
department of the Local Self Government at the secretariat which
was the liason agency between state government and local
government agencies. This led to Municipal Corporation doing ad
hoc work -- partly because they could not refuse since they had
become part of the state bureaucracy -- ie. the Corporation had
been superseded because of its ineffecient performance, and
partly, as the Corporation received very little tax money from
the landowners and homeowners in the Board's project areas.
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The result of incomplete projects coupled with a lack of
maintenance was visible, and perhaps more damaging than what
could be inferred from analyzing Housing Board's performance on
paper. These projects stood as testimonies to thirteen years of
Housing Board's performance and portrayed a sense of complete
organizational inefficiency. The morale of the upper and the
middle-level staff reached such a low level that fearing a
government inquiry into the operation of the Board, they wanted
to leave the Board as soon as possible and to go back to the
various state government departments from where most had been
deputed (to the Board). As a result, the Housing Board staff
petitioned the Chief Minister in late 1985 to abolish the
organization itself.
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CHAPTER 3
Evaluation
On the basis of the field research, it is evident that
Housing Board's goals, stated earlier, were not met. The
reasons why these goals were not met also appear to be evident
and we had identified several factors earlier that appear to be
possible constraints. Our story revolved around those factors.
We will re-examine the case study and try to establish the
relevance and dominance of those factors or, the extent to which
constraints were insurmountable. In other words, the purpose of
the re-examination is to trace the source of inefficiency in the
Housing Board. First, we will discuss the four factors that
have also been suggested by the various perspectives on
organizations. These are: (a) lack of direction; (b) lack of
individual incentives; (c) lack of coordination with
interdependent organizations, and (d) lack of adaptive capacity
and bargaining power. We will then examine Board's changing
image as a factor that appears to offer a unique explanation for
the Housing Board's performance.
(a) Was there a lack of direction because of multiple-goals?
It has been suggested in the literature that in
organizations having different and mutually contradictory goals,
one would expect a lack of direction and, therefore, the
organization's inability to meet those goals (Bales, 1963;
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Litterer, 1969).
We know from Chapter I, that the Housing Board also had
different and contradictory goals requiring different housing
strategies and addressing different target groups. For the
proposition stated above to be true, we would expect the Housing
Board to be implementing different housing strategies and,
therefore, lacking in focus. However, the strategy that the
Board adopted in 1972, essentially involving building
conventional public housing projects, continued for the next
thirteen years. More significantly, the Board did not change
that strategy despite the fact that several options had been
identified in the Housing Board Act -- the official document
framed by the leadership in 1972 which identified policies or
listed various housing strategies that the Board could choose
from (3). For example, some of the options that the Act had
identified included, Housing Board increasing housing stock by
producing building materials/housing components or by focusing
on land readjustment and land subdivision. We also know from
the case study that the Housing Board was under no policy
constraint, either from the state government or from the central
government, regarding which strategy to adopt. Housing Board's
semi-autonomous status enhanced its freedom to choose from the
various options. However, neither anyone questioned why the
other options were not even considered, nor was there an attempt
on the part of the Board to plan for these other strategies in
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the thirteen years; instead, what appears to have started as a
demonstration/experimental strategy, was never abandoned. Given
this evidence, we must conclude that the direction, however
undefined, was clear for all the leaders at the Housing Board.
We found a similar consistency in terms of the 'target
groups' that were to benefit from these housing projects. In
all the projects examined, the official pricing of housing units
indicated a definite bias. For a family belonging to Housing
Board's designated economically weaker section (EWS) category,
the cost of owning a unit was unreasonably high even if we
assume an unrealistically easy interest free payment schedule:
for example, the richest family in this income-category (earning
about $50 per month), was required to pay about 52% of this
monthly income on a 5-year schedule or 26% on a 10-year
schedule. The corresponding figures for the richest family in
the Low Income category (earning about $100 per month) was 60%
per month on a 5-year schedule or 30% on a 10-year schedule.
On a more qualitative level also, the bias was evident.
For example, throughout the thirteen years the application and
allotment procedures that the Board used suggest an
insensitivity towards the needs of either the rural migrants or
the urban poor. The lengthy paper work necessary to complete
these procedures required bank statements, references, and
affidavits certifying incomes. We can assume that these
formalities, written in legal jargon, would discourage the
largely illiterate and relatively unresourceful individuals.
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We believe that Housing Board's direction was not
intended to benefit the higher-income groups (earning above $200
per month) despite the fact that the housing units were more
affordable to this group than any other income group. The
higher-income groups had responded to the Demand Registration
Process conducted by the Board in 1972 to assess housing needs
of people in the entire state. The distribution of housing
'needs' in this process indicates that the 85% of the applicants
from the higher income groups had preferred plots/land to houses
of any kind. However, the Housing Board consistently pursued
the strategy building housing units and as a result, about 75%
of the applicants from the high income group had not been
alloted land by 1984. We can also conclude that
lobby of the high-income group failed to influence
leadership to change the organization's direction.
Field research supported this view for
find any powerful coalition within the organization
to favour a particular goal among the different
goals stated earlier in Chapter I. It was also not
planners, engineers or politicians on the Board
different goals on the basis their professional
the powerful
the Board's
we could not
that seemed
organization
true that
conformed to
affiliation.
For example, one would expect the townplanners in the
organization to favour the housing approach which advocated
land-use planning/zoning in conformity with a master plan as
opposed to the engineers in the organization who would favour a
more 'engineering' approach of constructing houses. One would
32
also expect the politicians to favour the 'engineering' approach
because of a high visibility of this approach. However, field
research clearly indicated that there were townplanners,
engineers and politicians who considered each others' approaches
as acceptable solutions to the housing problem. We could not
accurately determine why an organization with multiple goals
pursued a consistent direction of building housing flats that
were not even wanted by people who could afford them the most.
We can conclude, then, that there was no clear
relationship between Housing Board's multiple goals and its
inability to meet them because of a lack of direction.
(b) Was there a lack of individual incentives?
The literature on organizations has stressed that in
organizations having few inducements, one would expect a low
staff morale and, therefore, a high probability that the
organization's goals would not be met (March and Simon, 1959;
Price, 1968).
Lack of special incentives at the Housing Board for its
staff to work efficiently, was not unique to Housing Board as
other government organization in the state worked under similar
conditions. At the Housing Board, therefore, there were neither
special monetary inducements nor special promotional incentives
for the upper or the middle management staff, if they worked
hard to increase Housing's Board contribution to the housing
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stock or if they fought for the cause of people that were not
being addressed in Housing Board's projects. Nor were there any
sanctions if these goals were not met. These controls remained
unchanged throughout the period between 1972 and 1985. However,
there were major changes in staff morale and degree of goal
attainment during that period. We were told that staff morale
was unusually high between 1972 and 1975 when the Board was
successful in procuring large amount of land and in implementing
the Lohianagar project in a speedy manner. To a large extent,
the morale and the high output were due to the 'charisma' of the
chairman of the Board during that period. Subsequently,
morale and output continued to decline almost
though several well-meaning individuals led
between 1975 and 1985. Given the same set of
were available between 1972 - 1975, we find
exexutive heads (managing directors) serving in
in a period of seven years. We observe,
significant relationship between
inducements/sanctions, changes in staff morale
goal attainment.
steadily, even
the organization
incentives that
as many as seven
the organization
therefore, no
changes in
and degree of
We cannot make an a priori judgement, in short, that if
incentives and sanctions were increased, the goals that were
espoused would have been met. Since incentives had remained
invariant, this factor does not explain the particularly poor
performance of the Board in the later periods.
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the
(c) Was there a lack of coordination with other orqanizations?
In the literature on organizations, it has also been
suggested that -- for an organization dependent on other
organizations for approval of programs and supply of necessary
inputs for goal attainment, a good coordination would lead to
timely approvals and timely supply of inputs and, therfore, in
an ability of the organization to meet its stated goals (Mooney,
1947; Price, 1968)
The mechanism through which coordination was achieved at
the Housing Board was institutionalized. Heads of most
organizations that were required to formally approve Housing
Board's plans or that supplied key inputs, were Board members of
the Housing Board and met in the Board meeting regularly (twice
every month). Informal mechanisms and consultations were also
used for this purpose. Despite these mechaninsms, the case
study suggests a lack of inter-agency coordination to some
extent.
As far as approvals were concerned, we know from the case
study and from the previous discussion on "lack of direction"
that there were no policy constraints, either from the central
government or from the state and the local governments regarding
what the Board ought to do. Thus, lack of coordination with the
State's Housing and Planning Departments was neither an actual
nor a perceived constraint for the Housing Board.
On the other hand, lack of coordination with
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organizations supplying inputs (finance and land), partially
explains why the organization's goals were not met. We know
from the case study and Housing Board's Accounts that, as far as
finance is concerned, the funds that the Board had negotiated
with the state government or the financial institutions, were
supplied almost always in a timely manner. For example, the
Five year Plan allocations and state government loans came in
every year and project specific loans were also received every
year from the financial institutions. Only when project costs
rose more than estimated for, the supply of additional finance
was disrupted because of cost revisions (Housing Board Accounts,
1972 - 1985). Delays in getting these funds may explain why the
Housing Board could not complete its demonstration projects. We
can conclude that as a result, the Housing Board could not
expand its operations and, therefore, could not meet its goals.
However, this is a only a partial explanation because we have
not yet determined why project costs rose in the first place;
instead, we have only discussed the effects of increases in
project costs.
We find a similar partial explanation with respect to
the supply of land. Land was one of the inputs common to all
the housing strategies in the multiple-goals of the
organization. Procuring land was one of the main problems for
the Housing Board, either due to lengthy acquisition procedures
or because landowners simply refused to part with their land.
Since the procedures were lengthy and if coordinational
36
mechanisms did not work, it was extremely difficult for the
Board to do anything considering that the Revenue Department had
several other responsibilities besides acquiring land ( such as
collecting state taxes and manually updating a complex cadastral
data base). Yet, the Revenue Department was never represented
on the Board committee and the Board relied entirely on informal
mechanisms (such as telephones and memos) to expedite land
acquisition procedures. However, non-representation of Revenue
Department and the reliance on informal coordination mechanisms
remained unchanged till 1985, but there were major variations in
the supply of land between 1972 and 1985. In the initial years,
the largest amount of land was acquired in the least amount of
time (about 600 acres in 1 year). In the period between 1975 -
1985, we would expect better coordination since the executive
heads of the two organizations belonged to the same service
cadre, the IAS, - whose members are trained to maintain a very
close working network, and known to circumvent excessive
bureucratic procedures for members of their own network.
However, it took almost 10 years to acquire 1200 acres of land.
As in the case with finance, the relationship between
lack of coordination between the two organizations and delays in
the supply of land is evident and we can conclude that as a
result, the Housing Board could not expand its operations and,
therfore, could not meet its stated goals. However, this is
also only a partial explanation because we have not yet
determined why lanowners' refused to sell land during some
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periods as opposed to others; instead, we have only discussed
the effects of the phenomenon of refusal to sell land.
(d) Was there a lack of adaptive capacity and bargaininq power?
It has been suggested in the literature that an
organization exploits its environment to acquire resources
needed for its programs, and if the organization does not have
the capacity to respond to problems of acquiring those
resources, the organization will be unable to meet its stated
goals. (March and Simon, 1958; Hage, 1965; Pfeffer and Salnick,
1978).
It appears from the case study and the previous
discussion that, except for the initial years, the leaders of
the organization were either unaware of the nitty-gritty
problems of acquiring resources needed, mostly land (poor
feedback process), or that they were unable to exploit the
political and the legal environment in acquiring those resources
(poor bargaining power).
With the Board commitee making all major decisions for
the Board, one would expect an inefficient feedback process from
the field level to the top. But field research shows that even
within that centralized system, the feedback process was well
institutionalized and appeared to work. For example, the
regular Board meetings were forums where the recurrent problems
of acquiring land were widely discussed (at least twice a month)
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between the top management and the field staff, between the top
management and the financial institutions and within the Board
committee itself. At an informal level, discussion on these
problems had acquired the status of gossip. The leaders,
therefore, were fully aware of the innumerable problems that the
organization faced. However, since the number of decisions to
be handled by a few were large, we can expect delays in problem
solving in the short-run, and delays in changing the problematic
housing program itself in the long-run. As we saw in the case
study, the leadership was able to do neither because of the way
the political and the legal systems were manipulated between
1975 and 1985. We can conclude, therefore, that the capacity of
the Board to respond to problems had little to do with feedback
processes (which were working well); instead, it was limited by
the political appointments and court stay-orders on land
litigations during certain periods.
We saw in the case study that political appointments
were made by the political party, in exchange for the support of
the members of the legislative assembly (MLAs). The MLAs, in
turn, were obliged to listen to appeals of the people who had
elected them to power. Therefore, when the private landowners
appealed to prevent land acquisition, we would expect the MLAs
to interfere in land acquisition in some form or the other.
This seems to suggest that certain goals of the political party
and goals of the organization conflicted when the two systems
came together. This conclusion does offer an explanation of why
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Housing Board was unable to meet its goals. But as in the
previous discussion, the explanation is partial because we have
only examined the effects of fluctuating political appointments
and have not determined why, between 1972 and 1985, five
political appointments were suddenly made in 1975 (1 as
Chairman, 4 as housing experts) and why most of them were
removed in 1982 -- whereas we would expect the political party
to continue to use the organization as a means of distributing
favour.
If we combine the preceding argument with (c), where we
discussed lack of coordination in ensuring supply of land, we
find a similar partial explanation of why the Housing Board
leadership was unable to respond to the problems of land
acquisition. That is, though Housing Board's goals/programs had
a legal sanction and the Board had the legal right to acquire
land (power of eminent domain), it was unable to do so after
1975 because of the political appointments. However, resistance
of the landowners continued to grow stronger even though most
politicians left the organization in 1982 -- partly because of
legal precedents that had been established earlier. The
explanation is partial because we only know what the private
landowners did; we also need to know why they refused to part
with their land in certain periods as opposed to others.
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(e) Did the Board's changing image determine its performance?
We will discuss the proposition that the supply of key
inputs needed by an organization for goal attainment, is
determined by its image -- ie. the expectation of how the
organization will perform in future, from the perspective of
groups benefiting from its outputs.
We know that the Housing Board's formation brought it to
the attention of the media and gave the organization an aura of
exclusivity -- enhanced by the reputation of its first Chairman
and a notion that it had the blessings of the state's highest
political office at that time. The Board's output during the
initial years (as indicated by the land acquired) was relatively
very high and, therefore, the Board was also perceived to be
performing well. Two other unprecedented events reinforced this
image: Board's ability to acquire the largest single funding
from a financial institution (LIC) and the Board being allowed
to issue public bonds. These achievements reinforced the
Board's initial positive image and, therefore, it was expected
to perform well.
We believe that this initial expectation determined the
major events, the political appointments, around which the story
was told and which seem to be responsible for the Board's image
and its inability to meet the stated goals.
Since the organization was expected to perform well, we
can assume that it was expected to deliver significant amounts
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of valuable outputs, serviced land and housing. We can expect a
political party to distribute favours to its members in exchange
for their support. The Board, thus, was attractive to the
politcal party because of the expectation that the organization
would produce goods that the MLAs could capture or distribute
among friends, relatives or most importantly, among people who
helped them get elected to a position in the party. Since these
were valuable benefits in addition to the amenities that
normally came with a Chairman's position, we would expect the
ruling political party to fight any opposition and appoint MLAs
on the Board. Making appointments at a time when an
organization is successful, would not be motivated by collecting
kudos for the organization's performance -- partly because the
contribution of politicians (particularly the MLAs of Bihar) to
the functioning of organizations is well known to the public.
Even a well-meaning MLA, unfortunately carries the image of a
meddler in the efficient functioning of an organization. The
political appointments, therefore, are more likely to be
motivated by a desire to distribute favours. We can also
conclude that the better the image or stronger the expectation
that the organization would deliver the valuable goods, greater
would be the tendency or greater would be the number of
political appointments made. We can explain, therefore, the
appointment of the Chairman and those of four others in 1975, in
positions reserved for housing experts. In the case study, we
also saw Housing Board's output to continuously decline after
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1975 (associated with a declining image), with the organization
showing virtually no activity around 1982. In other words, the
organization was neither producing any valuable outputs nor was
it expected to produce enough in future. With relatively few
outputs forthcoming, we would expect the political party to
remove its appointees and detach itself from an organization
whose performance can be a political liability. Therefore, we
can explain why the political appointees were removed from the
Housing Board in 1982. This theory can be fully validated if we
wait to see what happens if the Housing Board performs well in
future.
This relationship between Board's changing image and
political appointments is central to this discussion for it
appears to establish a chain of causality that explains in a
consistent manner, the performance of the Housing Board between
1972 and 1985. In addition, it completes the partial
explanations that factors (c) and (d) offered earlier -- ie. it
answers the questions,
Why did landowners refuse to sell land during certain periods
as opposed to others? and,
Why did project costs rise?
Since we are suggesting a relationship between the theory just
discussed and these two questions, we need to know the mechanism
through which the phenomenon of political appointments and the
phenomenon of people's refusal to sell land, interacted during
certain periods to bring about increases in project cost. The
43
mechanism that we believe integrates these factors is the
profitabilty of owning land or investing in land in and around
the project areas; and the degree of profitability was
influenced by the Board's changing image.
When the politicians were appointed in the organization,
some of them from the land-owning class themselves, the private
landowners started to appeal to these elected representatives to
prevent their land from being acquired. Prior to these
appointments, the land owners could not appeal to the technical
staff as easily, because the technical staff, unlike the MLAs,
were not elected to their positions and, therefore, were not
obliged to entertain such complaints. In response to these
appeals, the politicians typically instituted committees to look
into the matter, which ended up being totally ineffective
because of the political pressures. The landlords also expected
a better chance of being granted a hearing by politicians on the
Board than by politicians outside the Board: politicians outside
the Board could not institute committees to look into land-
acquisition appeals as easily, because matters relating to semi-
autonomous organizations such as the Board, were outside the
jurisdiction of the state's legislative assembly.
Through these appeals, the landowners either expected to
obtain a higher compensation price than what the Board offered
or, if successful in preventing acquisition, they expected to
sell the land at a much higher price in future. For the
landowners the latter potential benefit, however, would be more
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attractive. Land prices would increase, firstly, with the
Board's announcement to acquire land because of the expectation
that the agricultural area to be developed, would be provided
with infrastructure, primarily roads and extension of water and
electricity trunk lines, thereby making commercial activity in
and around the project area viable. Board's implementation
strategy assured these expectations because the projects were
first provided with primary infrastructure that required much
less land than the housing which was supposed to follow. The
expectation that after the provision of primary infrastructure
Board's attempts to acquire land for building housing could be
thwarted, would increase the attractiveness to own land in that
area because the benefits of speculating or owning a
commercially-viable property would accrue to the few landowners
and not to the many allotees or tenants in a housing project.
That is, by definition there would be an increase in land prices
or in the rate of return of investing or speculating in land,
over and above what would occur if infrastructure was provided
and the Board was expected to acquire land efficiently for
building housing. 'Since land was an asset and, therefore, a
means of storing income, this additional increase in land prices
would increase the attractiveness of owning land in the project
area. This expectation would also be reinforced by the fact
that property taxation by the Municipal Corporation was highly
ineffective (5: for a general model on the determination of
rates of return and increases in land prices due to Board's
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inefficiency in acquiring land). The expectation that the Board
would be unable to acquire land for housing was reinforced by
the organization's poor performance as a result of political
meddling in land acquisition. Thus, there was a clear
relationship between landowner's refusal to sell land and the
result of political appointments on the Board. This
relationship is supported by the fact that despite Housing
Board's incomplete projects, rate of increase in land prices in
the project areas are well over that in the downtown and the
posh areas of the city, after accounting for general inflation.
(Annual compound inflation of land prices in project area was
27% versus an annual compound general inflation of 8.98% between
1972 and 1985).
The behaviour of the financial instituions can also be
explained now. The increased attractiveness or the increased
rate of return would also, by definition, encourage investments
to be made and, therefore, we would expect the financial
institutions to be investing in such projects. The investments
would be particularly forthcoming if loan repayments were
assured by the borrowing organization. Housing Board Accounts
between 1972 and 1985 support this view. Not only were funds
supplied regularly, loan repayments were made regularly, without
any fail. When the returns from the projects were poor from the
Board's perspective, we found the state government bailing out
the Housing Board by making the interest and loan repayments to
the financial institutions on time. We would therefore expect
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the financial institutions, not to be particularly upset by the
Board's image since any increases in rates of return would only
serve their interests.
Since supply of finance was never a real constraint for
the Housing Board, we only need to consider the dilemmas of land
litigations. We are not suggesting that every litigation case
was settled in the favour of the landowners; we are only
explaining a general trend between 1975 and 1985 and though the
politicians left the Board in 1982, so many legal precdents had
been established that we would expect similar delays between
1982 and 1985. The behaviour of the developers who had formed
private housing cooperatives would be motivated by exactly the
same factors that was relevant in the private landowners' case.
We would expect these developers to start construction on land
that either the Board had managed to acquire, or on land that
the developers themselves had managed to purchase from farmers
as soon as the housing projects were announced to the public.
Surveys in the project areas supported these trends. Most
farmers who owned the agricultural land prior to Board's
intervention said that they did not wish to go through the
formalities of land acquisition and court procedures, and that
they preferred to sell land to the developers who offered them
higher prices than what the Housing Board offered. It is not
surprising, then, that these developers formed housing
cooperatives 'overnight', built minimal shelters rapidly to
'legitimize' their claim, and appealed to the politicians on the
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Board to prevent land acquisition. The field research totally
supports this trend.
We can conclude that Housing Board's poor image in the
eyes of the landowners explains their resistance which,
therefore, explains delays and increases in project costs as a
result of those delays. The cummulative effects of this chain
of events were the badly maintained incomplete demonstration
projects that consumed most of the time, energy and money. The
inability to get out of this cycle explains why the goals
espoused by people in the organization were not met.
Housing Board's 1984 administrative report itself
substantiates this claim. If we consider output relative to the
number of housing applicants of even the first year (1972), the
Housing Board managed to only satisfy 11% of the economically
weaker section category, 17% of the low-income category and 10%
of the middle-income category. The goals of providing housing
for the rural migrants were never met. The goals of providing
planned land subdivisions to prevent development of 'slum-like
environment', were also not entirely achieved if we observe
Housing Board's recent Bahadurpur project in Patna. Since the
proponents of this goal had referred to the image and the unsafe
'environment' of slums, the Bahadurpur project fits the
description. It is said that even the police is afraid to go in
the project area after darki
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CONCLUSIONS
Several criticisms have been made about ineffeciencies
in public sector organizations in developing countries. It was
beyond the scope of our study to enter the ideological debate
over the usefulness of public institutions or to determine the
degree of efficiency/ inefficiency in quantitative terms. This
study has traced the source of inefficiency in one particular
public sector organization. In other words, we have tried to
explain a cycle of events that are likely to happen in a public
sector organization delivering certain kinds of goods in a
certain political environment.
We pointed out that when an organization uses a scarce
asset such as land as a key input and attempts to redistribute
it in the market after enhancing its value, groups which stand
to benefit from the increased value of that asset determine the
organization's output or its performance. In the case of
Housing Board, the groups/institutions that benefited most were
the ruling political party and the private landowners. (After
waiting for a long time, the benefits that people got in the
form of a piece of land or a housing unit were very few). When
the organization was performing well, the political party used
the organization to distribute favours. This process led to the
deterioration in the organization's performance. And the party
used this situation as well, to enhance its image by pulling out
its members, distancing itself. For the private landlords, the
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potential for substantial profits were introduced in a physical
land area where there wasn't one prior to the organization's
intervention. The result, by definition, was an increased
demand (for land) and a shortage because land was simply an
asset to be held for speculative purposes. A new kind of a
problem was created: the organization was stuck with a difficult
situation as the interplay between the organization and the two
vested interests had kept prime land underutilized and away from
alternative uses, and had hiked the price of land, thereby
making subsequent intervention more difficult. For the
organization, a certain kind of problem was created where
probably there wasn't one. The criticisms, if any, ought to be
directed less towards the organization and more towards the
small group who benefited from the organization and public
funds.
While this study has enabled us to answer why Housing
Board performed the way it did, several other questions remain
which can constitute the focus of further research. One
particular question that remains unanswered is whether
inefficient public sector organizations providing goods and
services other than land and housing have experienced a chain of
events similar to that of the Housing Board. This study, for
example, has explained the chain of events linking
organization's performance, political meddling, the
organization's declining image and its inabilty to perform well
subsequently. Future research could focus on semi-autonomous
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public sector organizations delivering other kinds of goods, to
establish why they performed poorly. In particular, did the
organization's image undergo a similar evolution? How did this
changing image affect the performance of the organization? Did
political meddling create similar insurmountable constraints?
Consequently, is the story of the Housing Board a generalized
phenomenon regarding public sector organizations, or is it a
story unique to organizations providing assets such as land --
(assets which are locationally unique, which provide a hedge
against inflation and which allow the owner to capture
significant unearned income).
Future research can also focus on success stories of
public sector organizations delivering land. It would be useful
to study such organizations and identify the forces responsible
for success. For example, the Madras State Housing Board in
India has been cited as one such case. Did this organization
face similar political constraints? How were they overcome?
Within this research agenda, it would also be useful to study
the performance of public sector organizations which have been
structured to operate more like private sector organizations.
We also observed increasing land prices to be a central
issue in this study. Escalating land prices, among other things
prevented Housing Board to operate cost-effectively. We
attributed this escalation to speculation which was a function
of the Board's image. Future research can carry out an in-depth
analysis of the determinants of land prices. How are they
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historically determined? Why does investment in land appear to
be more profitable than investment in other sectors of the
economy? More importantly,
intervention, through proj
price increases? How much
desirable -- ie. how much do
has added real value and
speculators are exploiting a
inefficiency? And finally,
rise?
to what extent does government
ects of this nature influence land
of this price rise is socially
land prices rise because government
how much do they rise because
situation created by government
who loses on account of this price
In addition to these implications for future research,
this story also provides some lessons for planning and policy.
In general, the groups for which organizations must plan and
make policy, ought to be those who stand to lose in this
political game. In the case of organizations like the Housing
Board, planning and policy ought to be explictly directed toward
the losers, the low-income tenants and the like, and not in a a
circumvent manner as in the case of the Housing Board.
Consequently, it appears to be a misplaced housing strategy,
from the perspective of the Housing Board, to be doing image-
building demonstration projects in the first place. As noted
earlier, this strategy will most likely create a housing problem
where one doesn't exist. From a policy standpoint, the vicious
circle in the case study suggests that the Housing Board ought
to focus its energies and resources to the problematic issue of
land, which is clearly one of the key inputs in any housing
52
supply strategy. The housing policy, therefore, ought to be
directed almost solely towards land (ie. a land policy). It
could take the form of simply acquiring and redistributing land
with the minimum of infrastructure, together with possibly an
allowance or a credit scheme for that group -- ie. a mix of
demand and supply strategies that would not involve
implementation problems of building housing projects. From an
organizational point of view, land acquisition ought to be done
by the same organization which ultimately redistributes it.
In suggesting these, we are assuming that there are
always a few motivated individuals within organizations who
would work to meet organization's goals even if there were not
many incentives or sanctions.
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END NOTES
1
According to the Indian Constitution's Articles 352-356, the
President of India can declare President's Rule in the entire
country or in any of its states. This declaration is made in
situations such as: the ruling political party losing majority;
ruling party's term expiring and delays in election; extreme
internal security problems. In such cases, the President's
nominee in the state, the Governor, takes over the executive
powers (of a Chief Minister) and heads state's administration,
in addition to carrying out a Governor's customary role as a
symbolic head of state, advising the Central government
occasionally on the state's political situation.
2
Under the President's Rule, the President of the country or
the Governor of a state can issue decrees (Ordinances). These
ordinances must be renewed every six months since they are not
formed by the legislators of an elected ministry. Bills passed
by the legislators are called Acts and do not have to be renewed
like ordinances.
3
The housing policies/strategies of the central and state
governments listed in the Housing Board Act are in as broad
terms and as many as: economically weaker section housing; low-
income group housing; middle-income group housing; rental
housing; housing for industrial workers; land acquisition and
development scheme; slum improvement scheme; town improvement
scheme; land redistribution and land readjustment;
infrastructure provision scheme; production of building
materials/housing components etc...
4
With Housing Board announcing its intentions to acquire land
for a project, land prices in the project area were supposed to
freeze and land sales between landowners prohibited. The
compensation price that the Board (through the Revenue
Department) paid for land acquired from landowners, was based on
actual sales price of similar land in the vicinity in the recent
past. The compensation price would always be lower than the
market price because people reported a lower-than-actual sales
price in order to save on stamp duty, transfer taxes and, most
importantly, on the regular property taxes.
continued...
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Determination of the rate of return of investment in land.
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